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Battelle is working with ID Quantique to create a new quantum device called a QKD Trusted Node™.^[1]
In its simplest form, QKD requires a sender and a receiver who prepare and measure photons, respectively.^[2]
Aerospace is developing a proof of concept of QKD for space systems while also investigating its regulatory and market implications.^[3]
In the United States, a number of financial services firms already use QKD to transmit data through fiber-optic cables.^[3]
Concurrently, Aerospace’s CSPS is examining the policy actions required for widespread adoption of QKD aboard satellites.^[3]
Yet around that time, China launched a satellite demonstrating QKD over a ground system.^[3]
In this article, we introduce the theory of the security of QKD and say a few words about practical security where we use practical devices.^[4]
In this section, we give a brief explanation of quantum mechanics, which is necessary to understand how QKD works.^[4]
This kind of QKD protocol is called discrete variable QKD since the measurement outcome is bit information.^[4]
So far we have had a quick look at QKD.^[4]
Today’s interest in QKD arises largely from rapid progress in another quantum technology: quantum computing.^[5]
That’s because QKD rests on fundamental physical principles rather than specific mathematical assumptions.^[5]
For use as light source for QKD, polarization-modulated single photons are an obvious choice, but can be quite challenging to implement.^[5]
Both single-photon and laser-light schemes assume that the QKD receiver intrinsically trusts the QKD sender.^[5]
The performance of parallel QKD is also verified by using the off‐the‐shelf wavelength division modules and the on‐chip soliton source.^[6]
We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures.^[7]
For the past year, we have used QKD to protect the networks at our Columbus, Ohio headquarters.^[8]
QKD is the best technically feasible means of generating secure encryption.^[8]
If you have data that you want to protect for years, QKD makes a lot sense.^[8]
The defining characteristic of QKD is its alleged superior secrecy guarantee that would justify its use for high security applications.^[9]
However, deployment constraints specific to QKD hinder large-scale deployments with high practical security.^[9]
Any device reconstructing the signal on this channel is therefore incompatible with QKD.^[9]
QKD can also be used without symmetric cryptography to provide communication security independently of an adversary’s computational power.^[9]
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is getting a lot of attention these days, particularly among cybersecurity experts – and rightfully so.^[10]
QKD works by transmitting millions of polarized light particles (photons) over a fiber optic cable from one entity to another.^[10]
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the only provably secure communication method because it uses physics – not math – to encrypt data.^[10]
The security of QKD stems from the ability to detect any intrusion on the QKD transmission.^[10]
This article surveys previously applied methods, showing techniques for deploying QKD networks and current challenges of QKD networking.^[11]
Quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on quantum communication to allow distant parties to share a secure cryptographic key.^[12]
Widespread adoption of QKD in current telecommunication networks will require the development of simple, low-cost, and stable systems.^[12]
A computer (CMP) then reads the TDC data and uses it for temporal synchronization, polarization compensation, and QKD.^[12]
This transformation is troublesome for QKD since it causes Alice and Bob to effectively have different polarization reference frames.^[12]
QKD provides a way of distributing and sharing secret keys that are necessary for cryptographic protocols.^[13]
Laboratory demonstrations and some field tests of QKD in the 1990s paved the way for the first commercial systems in the early 2000s.^[13]
This is expected to accelerate in the coming years and more integrated solutions are adapted for QKD.^[13]
Thus, security of QKD and QC is highly implementation-dependent rather than assured by laws of physics.^[14]
QKD generates keying material for an encryption algorithm that provides confidentiality.^[14]
QKD does not provide a means to authenticate the QKD transmission source.^[14]
QKD is based on physical properties, and its security derives from unique physical layer communications.^[14]
QKD implementation requires interactions between the legitimate users.^[15]
The main drawback of Quantum Key Distribution is that it usually relies on having an authenticated classical channel of communications.^[16]
Quantum key distribution is only used to produce and distribute a key, not to transmit any message data.^[16]
Quantum key distribution exploits certain properties of these quantum states to ensure its security.^[16]
Id Quantique has successfully completed the longest running project for testing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in a field environment.^[16]
3 Examples of optical layouts for sources used in polarization encoded DV-QKD designed for satellite QKD.^[17]
a A weak coherent pulse source for BB84 QKD (adapted from ref.^[17]
Reflective mirrors can be larger, although for polarization-based QKD care must be taken to prevent large depolarization effects.^[17]
5 Noise contributions to entanglement-based QKD between Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) in a scenario such as Fig.^[17]
29 Ma, X., Qi, B., Zhao, Y. & Lo, H.-K. Practical decoy state for quantum key distribution.^[18]
Experimental long-distance decoy-state quantum key distribution based on polarization encoding.^[18]
A. J. Unconditionally secure one-way quantum key distribution using decoy pulses.^[18]
81 Yuan, Z. L., Dynes, J. F. & Shields, A. J. Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD.^[18]
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security.^[19]
Here, we present a general and simple framework to guarantee the security of QKD in the presence of arbitrary classical pulse correlations.^[19]
Security analysis in the presence of pulse correlations In this section, we present the security analysis of QKD with pulse correlations.^[19]
That is, it can be used to prove the security of QKD in the presence of active and/or passive information leakage.^[19]
The land-based version of QKD is a system where photons are sent one at a time through a fiberoptic line.^[20]
China is furthest ahead with QKD, with dedicated pipes connecting Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities.^[20]
Plus, QKD requires the use of relays.^[20]
Adoption of QKD for conventional business communications is a small opportunity right now and we don’t expect a real take off until 2025.^[21]
Together at last: Until quite recently, Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) were marketed as a rival to QKD.^[21]
QKD could be applied to exchange a key between the two ends of a communication.^[22]
An article by ITU-T SG13 chair Leo Lehmann, PhD, described new ITU-T Recommendations related to IMT 2020 and Quantum Key Distribution.^[22]

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[{'LOWER': 'quantum'}, {'LOWER': 'key'}, {'LEMMA': 'distribution'}]
[{'LEMMA': 'QKD'}]

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